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Adescription of the procedures followed by Colombian authorities in granting
or rejecting import requests produces an impression of overwhelming com-
plexity, particularly to market-oriented economists. It seems hard to under-
stand how a handful of authorities, aided by a small staff, can cope with the
estimated 150,000 import requests per year, and even harder to see how such
requests can be processed in a sensible and systematic manner.
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to throw some light on this
question by analyzing 1970 registered imports according to size of importers.
It will be seen that because the import control authorities are familiar with
about 500 major private importers, they are able to be reasonably sure about
the destination of half the total value of registered imports. It is not farfetched
to suppose that those 500 major importers make up the core of the Colombian
socioeconomic system, and that they and the INCOMEX authorities know
each other fairly well. With half of the imports going to 500 companies, and
about 20 per cent going to the public sector, only 30 per cent has to be
distributed in retail fashion.
An attempt will also be made in this chapter to quantify some aspects of
INCOMEX behavior in accepting or rejecting import requests, as revealed by
its handling of a sample of such requests during 1971.
Basic data for the type of exercise tackled in this chapter are not easily
available. The data submitted to INCOMEX with import requests are rich,
and potentially constitute a running census of at least the major Colombian
industrial and commercial enterprises. It is a pity that such an opportunity for
an up-to-date and continuous flow of information is largely wasted. Resolution
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15 forms are thrown out shortly after INCOMEX decides on the import k
request, and only summary information on import registrations and requests o
appears to be maintained. Putting all of the data contained in Resolution 15
forms into a properly programmed computer would provide INCOMEX with
a systematic and accessible source of information regarding importers as well e
as of other valuable data for decision-making, and would give the country a
clearer idea of its economic structure. Coordination of import controls with a
tax enforcement and price controls would also become a more practical
possibility. Perhaps the analysis in this chapter will illustrate how rich the data w
available to INCOMEX are. n
During the second half of 1971, INCOMEX officials kindly allowed me to d
examine about 2,500 license requests in the commercial and industrial cate-
gories. The sample included cases of several requests from the same corn-
pany. The requests had been either accepted or rejected, totally or partially, n
by the Junta de Importaciones of INCOMEX. A smaller sample (199) was also
taken of requests in the official category. In choosing the requests, no refined
sampling method was followed; basically I tried to get information on those
requests that were around at the time, and were made available for examina-
tion. As relatively few applications were being rejected during the second half
of 1971, 1 made a special effort to obtain data on rejected requests. There was
also a bias in favor of obtaining requests from as many different companies as N
possible. There does not appear to be any major seasonal pattern to license c
requests,except a decline in numbers in December and January; so the —
exclusiveuse of the half-year of information should not introduce any bias.
From the license requests two types of information were obtained: a
censuslike coverage of imports, employment, and other characteristics for
each company (not plant) in 1970, and data on the specific import request
during the second half of 1971 (amount, rejection or acceptance, and reasons
for rejections).
The former type of information will be discussed first. It should be added
that the information obtained in my sample did not include all data made
available in the import requests, because of obvious constraints on research
facilities. For example, import and tax data in the forms were given for four
years (1968 through 1971). Other information, such as local purchases of
goods similar to the requested imports, was so spotty that a decision was
made to ignore it.
MAJOR COLOMBIAN IMPORTERS IN 1970
Following INCOMEX categories, major private importers can be subdivided
into an industrial and a commercial group. Industrial importers use imports in
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local buyers. While Resolution 15 forms give no information on the ownership
of the company making the import request, a somewhat rough-and-ready
separation was also made according to presumed nationality.1 In general, it
was presumed that a company was Colombian-owned unless there was firm
evidence to the contrary. Only companies for which foreign ownership came
to 50 per cent or more were treated as foreign-owned; all others were regarded
as national. There were, however, relatively few joint ventures in the sample.
Note that the definition of foreign-owned companies used here is considerably
weaker than that used in the Andean code on foreign investment. Lack of
reliable and up-to-date data was the major reason for my choice of the
definition, which implies a higher share of national ownership.
Table 6-1 contains a summary of major industrial2 importers, classified
according to their ownership status (domestic or foreign) and the value of their













Major Industrial Importers in Colombia, 1970
Industrial Cos. Income and
No. Classified by
Ownership and
Registered No. of Minor Exports,Sales Taxes
of Imports, 1970 Employees 1970 Paid in 1970
Cos. Value of Imports (mill. U.S. dol,) (thous.) (mill. U.S. dol.)(mill. pesos)
Imports of more than
$1.0 mill.
49 Foreign owned 167.22 25.50 20.02 563.02
31 Domestic 107.49 48.34 18.98 966.38
80 Total 274.71 73.84 39.00 1,529.40
Imports between $0.5
mill, and $1.0 miH.
27 Foreign owned 19.76 12.25 3.58 127.92
36 Domestic 23.59 19.02" 221.99
63 Total 43.35 31.27 10.81 349.91
Imports between $0.1
mill, and $0.5 mill.
58 Foreign owned 15.43 12.73 3.19 127.58
119 Domestic 27.99 42.11 45.90" 456.08
117 Total 43.42 54,84 49.09 583.86
320Grand total 361.48 159.95 98.90 2.463. 17
134 Foreign owned 202.41 50.48 26.79 818.72






a. Refers to only 35 companies.
b. Includes sugar exports. A total of six sugar companies included in this table exported $40.0 million.Commercial Cos. Registered Income and
No. Classified by Imports, 1970 No. of Minor Exports,Sales Taxes
of Ownership and (mill. U.S. Employees 1970 Paid in 1970
Cos. Value of Imports do!.) (thous.) (mill. U.S. do!.)(mill, pesos)
Imports of more than
$1.0 mill.
6 Foreign owned 14.06 0.88 0.67 55.78
14 Domestic 25.38 9.52° 1.05 16.43
20 Total 39.44 10.40 1.72 72.21 .
Imports between $0.5
mill, and $1.0 milL
5 Foreign owned 4.07 0.83 0 22.69
20 Domestic 13.33 2.02 0.78 25.81
25 Total 17,40 2.85 0.78 48.50
Imports between $0.1
mill, and $0.5 mill.
13 Foreign owned 3.30 2.01 0.15 15.64
122 Domestic 25.53 13.04 56.50
135 Total 28.83 15.05 17.32 72.14
180Grand total 85.67 28.30 ' 19.82 192.85
24 Foreign owned 21.43 3.72 0.82 94.11
156 National 64.24 24.58 19.00 98.74
SOURCE: Seetext. lot
a. Refers to only 13 companies. sel
b. Includes exports of association of banana growers.
employees, value of their minor exports, and amounts of income and sales
taxes they paid. Three subdivisions according to size are made: companies
that imported more than $1 million in 1970; those importing between $0.5
million and $1 million; and those whose imports ranged between $0.1 million
and $0.5 million.
Table 6-1 shows that there is a striking degree of concentration, which
helps explain the relatively smooth operation of the Colombian import control
system. Thus, just 80 industrial companies captured in the sample and
assigned to the first group accounted for 30 per cent of all 1970 registered
imports. In that year, those same companies accounted for 21.2 per cent of all
income and sales taxes paid in Colombia, and employed 19.2 per cent of all
those engaged in manufacturing.3 Given the way the data were obtained, some
large importers may have been missed. Therefore, the estimates presented in
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TABLE 6-2



















100Imports5 of more than $1 mill. $314.15 34.1% 22.2%
88Imports' between $0.5 mill.
and $1 mill. 60.75 6.6 5.5
312Imports' $0.1 mill, and $0.5
mill. 72.25 7.8 9.1
500 Total 447.15 48.6 36.8
158 Foreign owned 223.84 24.3 12.6
342 National 223.31 24.3 24.2
Addendum: otlicially registered,
reimbursable imports 145.20 15.8 —
SouRcE: Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
a. Covers both foreign.owned and domestic companies.
Table 6-1 and subsequently, for both import concentration and degree of
foreign control, may be regarded as minimum ones. Further, there could be
cases in which several companies are under the control of a single conglomer-
ate or family group.
Note that, even neglecting data problems, it would not be easy to
interpret the information presented in Table 6-1. Neither comparable cross-
sectional nor time series data are available for Chenery-like tests of "normal-
ity." Even if they were, further analysis involving variables such as industrial
structure would be required before establishing whether the degree of concen-
tration shown is more or less than could be expected if import controls did not
exist.
Table 6-2 contains parallel data for the commercial category, and the data
there and in Table 6-1 are summarized in Table 6-3. There were in 1970 at least
100 companies importing more that $1 million worth of goods (with an average
of $3.1 million each), accounting for 34 per cent of all registered imports.
Fifty-five foreign-owned companies in this group alone represented 20 per
cent of all Colombian registered imports in 1970.
The degree of concentration falls off rapidly once companies with imports
worth less that $1 million are considered. Thus, the 88 companies, foreign and
national, industrial and commercial, that were found to have imports worth
between $0.5 million and $1 million accounted for only 7 per cent of all imports
in 1970, while the 312 companies having imports worth between $100,000 and
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TABLE 6-3
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$500,000 represented an additional 8 per cent of the import bill. In round
numbers, as noted earlier, 500 companies handled at least half of Colombian
imports. The same companies accounted for 37 per cent of all income and
sales tax payments, and 32 per cent of those employed in "modern" com-
merce and manufacturing.
Because of the economic importance of those firms importing more than
$1 million, their names and presumed major activity are given in an appendix
to this chapter. This appendix and other data (not shown) indicate the heavy
concentration of import-intensive foreign investors in chemicals, pharmaceu-
ticals, and metal-mechanic industries, which are typically associated with fairly
recent import substitution. Colombian-owned companies are more spread out
among different activities.
The 80 industrial companies importing more than $1 million a year in
1970—7 1 hired an average of 923 employees. An additional 63 companies,
importing between $0.5 million and $1 million, had each an average of 496
employees. Finally, the 177 industrial companies in the third category had an
average of 310 employees each. A comparision of these figures with data
reported by the Colombian Ministry of Labor and Social Security suggests
that the sample succeeded in registering at least the largest Colombian firms, if
it is assumed that most of the largest firms according to employment are also
the largest importers.4
Table 6-1 reveals major industrial exporters among the major importers.
It has been estimated5 that registered Colombian manufactured exports
(excluding items such as sugar) reached $76.7 million during 1970; the 80
largest importers would thus account for 50 per cent of these exports. The
largest 314 industrial importers (excluding several sugar mills) would account
for 77 per cent of manufactured exports.
A ranking of major importers by level of exports permits a more accurate
measure of industrial export concentration. The 14 largest national industrial
exporters in the sample (excluding sugar mills) had registered industrial
exports of $26.89 million in 1970, while the 10 largest foreign-owned exporting
industrial companies had $20.41 million of exports in 1970. Thus, 24 industrial
companies accounted for 62 per cent of all (nonsugar) industrial exports.
Foreign-owned companies alone supplied at least 27 per cent of all Colombian
industrial exports in 1970.
Some important characteristics of major industrial importers-exporters
are highlighted in Table 6-4. Average wages decline with company size as
measured by annual imports, but in each size category foreign-owned compa-
flies show higher wages than national firms. Foreign companies also have
higher imports per employee in each size category than do national compa-
nies, with imports per employee declining with size for both groups. The 49
foreign-owned industrial companies importing more than $1 million worth
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although their exports per employee are higher than those of national firms in
the same import size category, their "trade deficit" remains far superior to
those in any other category. As a rule, large foreign-owned companies are
more concentrated in Bogota than large national firms. In a later section of this
paper, these characteristics will be re-examined for the total sample of compa-
nies. =
Amongthe most striking facts about the 24 major exporters, 10 foreign-
owned and 14 national, are: (a) the persistence of a "trade deficit" and (b) the
large average size of these companies (see the last two rows of Table 6-4).
Neither fact fits well with an image of firms producing labor-intensive manu-
factured exports. Rather, the suggestion of both facts is that many of the same
companies which in the past benefited, and which still benefit, from import-
intensive import substitution now benefit from the newer export-promotion
policies. It is nevertheless encouraging that these companies are less concen-
trated in Bogota than other groups shown in the same table.
Income and sales taxes paid per employee, like wages and imports per
employee, appear to decline with company size. In contrast to the cases of
wages and imports, the national companies show higher tax payments per
employee in the two smallest size categories. In spite of their large average
size, the 24 large exporters show relatively small cash tax payments, a fact
which may be explained by Colombian export subsidy schemes.
In summary, a picture of substantial concentration emerges from this
review of major 1970 private importers. It is not possible to determine from
the data whether such concentration is higher or lower than in other countries,
nor whether it is encouraged or discouraged by the import control system
(more on this below). But the data do help explain why the management of
import controls is not as impossible a task as it appears at first sight when one
is told that a handful of authorities decide on about 150,000 import applica-
tions per year. Some 500 private companies play a major role not only in the
import field, but in exporting and as tax collectors for the government. Note
that only income and sales tax data have been discussed; the same 500
companies must also pay a very large share of all import duties.6
REVEALED INCOMEX CRITERIA
FOR ACCEPTING OR REJECTING
IMPORT LICENSE REQUESTS
The analysis of characteristics of license requests approved or rejected (partly
or totally) by INCOMEX during the second half of 1971 can shed some light
on the question of biases created by the import control system as compared






INCOMEXReasons for Rejecting Applications for Import Licenses and Tabulation of Sample
of Rejected Licenses During July—December 1971




I.Commodity is produced within Colombia 24.5 15.9 13.3











)n 4.Foreign price is excessive 0.6 4.8 2.4
.
5.Quantity and/or value requested is
excessive relative to past record 0.9 2.1 0
•er i
6.Import or approval category temporarily
restricted 2.5 0.8 4.8
of 7.Inadequate information given to justify
er need for requested import, modification,
ge or addition 1.3 1.4 4.8
tct 8.Inadequate product description (lack of
catalogues, etc.) 6.1 9.0 3.6
.
. 9.Lack of exact and detailed product
specification in the request, per existing
rn regulations 10.2 11.5 12.0
10.Adequate stocks of products are found
domestically 0.6 0.1 0
of 11.Requests by applicant for indentical or .












There is shortage of foreign exchange
Requested imports out of proportion to
taxes paid
Tax information missing
Data on imports provided by applicant do
not agree with those of INCOMEX
Excessive expenditures













control agency, are lacking
Other special reasons










































1.270 per cent (0.2) (0.3) (0)
Unspecified (2.8) (5.6) (0)
lines 1-49 100.0 100.0 100.0
Addendum:
Requests for which more than one reason
was given for rejection (totally or partly) 81 75 14
Total of reasons given for rejecting requests
(totally or partly), including partial
approvals 849 710 83
SOURCE: See text. See also Table 6-6 for total number of requests and their average values.
of the reasons given by INCOMEX for rejecting import requests in the
sample; more than one reason is frequently given. The potential importer is
handed a mimeographed sheet on which are listed 18 possible reasons for
rejection, with those applying to his request bearing a check mark.
Many rejections are only partial, particularly under the industry category,
as indicated by item 19 in the table. More serious rejections appear to be based
on protectionist grounds, as reflected in reasons 1, 2, and, very likely, 8 and 9.
For the commercial category these four items account for 46 per cent of the
reasons for rejection, while for industry the corresponding figure is 40 per
cent. The commercial requests also seem to be closely scrutinized for "exces-
sive" imports (reason 11) and tax evasion (reason 13). Industrial requests are
scrutinized for overinvoicing (reason 4). In this area INCOMEX claims to
have saved the country several million dollars by keeping foreign-owned
companies, especially those in the pharmaceutical field, from remitting exces-
sive profits to their headquarters abroad by overinvoicing. Such claims appear
to be substantially correct, as noted in Chapter 5.Closeranalysis is handi-
capped because roughly one-tenth of the rejections in the industrial and
commercial categories and almost half of those in the official category are
justified by "other special reasons" (line 18).
The average characteristics of approved, rejected, and partially rejected
import requests in the industrial and commercial categories are laid out in
Table 6-6. Note first that our sample contains (by design) a higher average of
rejected requests than seems to have been typical during the second half of
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1971. While at that time it was said that only about 15 per cent of all requests
were being turned down, 25percent of the industrial requests and 43 per cent
of the commercial ones appear to have been totally rejected. The companies in
the sample are on average larger than those in the whole industrial and
commercial sector. While this fact in itself is not surprising, it is also probably
true that the sample is biased in the direction of overrepresentation of larger
importing firms and larger import requests.
The large standard deviations shown in Table 6-6 warn of the difficulty of
generalizing with confidence about the characteristics of accepted, rejected,
and partially rejected requests. Note also that because of lack of data, some
very important features of import requests are omitted; for example, the
questions of whether the proposed import was competitive with some local
product and whether it originated in countries having preferential trade agree-
ments with Colombia.
In spite of these limitations, an attempt has been made to establish which
characteristics of the import requests, and of the companies making them,
made INCOMEX more likely to accept such petitions. As some important
independent variables are left out of the analysis, we cannot expect to obtain
good fits. A less ambitious goal will be to isolate characteristics which
significantly influence INCOMEX in the decision to accept or reject each
application, ceteris paribus. The analysis may be interpreted as measuring an
INCOMEX supply function for import licenses, while neglecting the demand
function for such licenses, or assuming, as a not unreasonable first approxima-
tion, that the demand for licenses is perfectly elastic at the going transaction
costs involved in applications.
The dependent variable that is to be statistically explained is somewhat
unusual. If all applications are divided simply into those accepted or rejected,
the variable will only take values of zero for rejections and 1 for approvals.
Under these dichotomous circumstances, multivariate probit analysisis
known to be a superior technique to the usual least squares multiple regres-
sions.7 In our sample, applications partly rejected present an intermediate
case, which can be handled in different ways. In what follows, the probit
analysis will be applied in three ways: leaving out partial rejections, treating
them as total rejections, and also treating them as total approvals. The
dependent variable for partially rejected requests can also be expressed as a
fraction of the value of the license granted by INCOMEX; in that case, there
will be intermediate observations between zero and 1. Ordinary least squares
will be used to analyze this form of the dependent variable.
The best results obtained are shown in tables 6-7 and 6-8, best being
determined by the number of coefficients that had interesting values relative to
their standard errors. Several other independent variables, not shown, were caINCOMEX CRITERIA FOR DISPOSITION OF IMPORT LICENSE REQUESTS165
ts TABLE6-7
Industrial Category: Regressions for Approval (1) or Rejection (0) of Import Requests
In in Sample
id (ratio of coefficients to their standard errors in parentheses)
ly
er Probit Analysis
Least Partial Partial Partial
of Squares RejectionsRejectionsRejections
d
RegressionOmitted as (1) as (0)
ne Constant 0.303 —0.900 —0.937 —0.246
he (1.60) (1.95) (0.50)
:al Nonreimbursable (1) or reimbursable 0.247 1.101 0.927 1.404
• (0) category (6.57) (5.87) (5.11) (7.31)
Log of value of all import 0.0 10 0.038 0.042 0.026
ch registrations in 1970 (1.17) (1.24) (1.42) (0.91)
fl, Log of no. of employees 0.013 0.049 0.050 0.025
nt per 1970 imports (1.13) (1.09) (1.23)
Ufl Log of value of requested imports —0.042 —0.134 —0.046 —0.229
ch (5.12) (1.91)
ch
Log of 1970 income and sales taxes 0.014 0.050 0.031 0.053
an paid per 1970 imports (2.81) (2.83) (1.90) (3.34)
flu
Logof 1970 minor exports per 1970 —0.013 —0.054 —0.041 —0.045
imports (2.56) (2.79) (2.65)
on
Log of average wage 0.043 0.162 0.153 0.100
(2.43) (2.28) (2.55) (1.59)
Per cent of 1970 import —0.000 —0.001 0.000 —0.001
Is'.
registrations unused (0.50) (1.52) (0.14) (1.49)
is Bogota or MedellIn (1) or elsewhere (0) 0.054 0.195 0.215 0.119
(2.06) (2.44) (1.37)
tte R2 0.103
bit F statistic 16.32 — — —
.ng —2.0 x log of likelihood ratio — 118.20 75.01 229.51
he No. of observations 1,284 1,072 1,284 1,284
unsuccessfully tried. On the whole, it will be seen that the different techniques
res used to analyze the data yield similar qualitative results.
Import requests in the nonreimbursable category, i.e., those which do not
ing involve an immediate claim on foreign-exchange resources, clearly have a
tO much better chance of being approved than those under the reimbursable
ere category, in both the industrial and commercial classifications. In both classi-166IMPORT CONTROLS IN 1970—71: SOME QUANTIFIABLE FEATURES
TABLE 6-8
Commercial Category: Regressions for Approval (1) or Rejection (0) of Import Requests
in Sample












Nonreimbursable (1) or reimbursable 0.115 0.421 0.220 0.535
(0) category (2.98) (3.14) (1.74) (4.02)








Log of value of 1970 import • —0.002 0.001 —0.0 16 0.006
registrations per employee (0.27) (0.04) (0.57) (0.19)








Log of 1970 income and sales taxes 0.010 0.023 0.034 0.015
paid per employee (1.43) (0.87) (1.50) (0.60)
Log of 1970 minor exports per 0.0 16 0.042 0.054 0.037
employee (1.91) (1.23) (1.93) (1.16)








Per cent of 1970 import registrations —0.000 —0.000 —0.000 —0.000
unused (0.05) (0.29) (0.18) (0.04)








R2 0.197 — — —
F statistic 32.90 — —
—2.0 x log of likelihood ratio — 281.74 84.98 417.87



























fications, smaller import requests
approved than larger ones. When
also clearly have a better chance of being
partial rejections are counted as approvals
(third column of Table 6-7) on the supposition either that the company will be
happy to have obtained a share of its perhaps inflated request or that it can
always present a new request later on, the significance of the coefficient for
the absolute size of the import request declines but remains high. As seen in
Table 6-6, the average value of license applications that were partially rejectedINCOMEX CRITERIA FOR DISPOSITION OF IMPORT LICENSE REQUESTS167
was higher than that for complete approvals and rejections. For reimbursable
industrial requests, a breakdown of the requests into ten groups according to
the size of requests shows the negative relation between complete approval
and size of request to be quite smooth, with the percentage of total approvals
declining steadily from 77 per cent for the smallest to 36 per cent for the
largest. In the commercial category, the decline in the acceptance rate is even
steeper. On the whole, these facts indicate that INCOMEX authorities,
ions besides their protectionist guidelines, still operated during the second half of
)) 1971 with an eye (somewhat myopic) to rationing foreign exchange.
Do large firms have a better chance of obtaining desired licenses than
58) smaller firms? Size was measured in two ways: number of employees and
535 value of 1970 import registrations. Both measures gave substantially the same
02) results; those using 1970 imports are shown in Table 6-7 for industrial
requests, while those using employment levels are shown in Table 6-8 for
65) commercialrequests. The hypothesis being tested is that chances for approval
increase steadily with size, even when other company and license characteris-
19) tics are also taken into account. For the industrial category, the hypothesis
539 receivesonly modest support; support is strongest when partial rejections are
treated as approvals, which for large companies may be a quite suitable
015 assumption. In the commercial category, the significance of the size variable is
uniformly superior to that for industrials, and indicates a clear and smooth link
between size and chances of approval, even after other variables are taken into
account.I return to this issue below.
043 Company size is of course highly correlated with variables such as taxes
:79) paidand exports. Therefore, some other independent variables were defined
relative to the size variable. In the case of industrial license requests, chances
for approval significantly increased as taxes relative to either imports or em-
ployees increased. Somewhat surprisingly, the evidence for such a hy-
.210 pothesis is much weaker in the commercial group. Also surprisingly, a
significant negative link appears for industrial requests between minor exports
— relativeto imports and chances of approval. This result is inconsistent with
— theusual INCOMEX claims that industrial exporters are favored in the
grantingof import licenses. However, as shown in Table 6-12, below, a closer
look at the data casts doubts on the robustness of this revealed negative link,
at least for companies located in Bogota or MedellIn. It remains possible that
•ring some INCOMEX officials felt that large exporters, relative to their 1970
-vals imports, were already obtaining enough fresh imports via the Vallejo Plan,
1 be under which the companies were exempted from the prior license rules. Most
can participants in the Vallejo Plan are large firms.
•for Finally, the correlation coefficients among the independent variables
n in shown in tables 6-7 and 6-8 fail to show widespread collinearity problems.
cted Indicating the independent variables in Table 6-7 as X1,X2,. .., X9,following168IMPORT CONTROLS IN 1970—7 1: SOME QUANTIFIABLE FEATURES
the order in which they are shown in that table, their correlation coefficients
are as follows:




X5 .08 —.24 .37 —.08
.09 —.51 .50 —.12 .24
X7 .10 .38 —.42 .06 —.07 —.13 — —
X8 — .01 — .02 .01 .00 .00 .02 — .02 —
X9 .06 — .03 — .02 .09 .05 —.15 .01 .02
Similarresults are obtained for the independent variables of Table 6-8.
There are interesting relationships among the size, export, wage, and tax
variables discussed for major importers in the first section of this chapter and to
be further explored below for all companies in the sample, but they do not
appear seriously to mar the results of tables 6-7 and 6-8.
INDUSTRIAL COMPANY SIZE AND INCIDENCE
OF APPROVAL: A CLOSER LOOK
The hypotheses dealing with the links between chances of approval and size,
geographical location, and generation of minor exports will be further exam-
ined in this section for industrial companies. It will be shown that the largest
industrial companies, particularly those in Bogota and MedellIn, do in fact
have a better chance than smaller firms of obtaining import licenses.
The data, as shown in the last columns of tables 6-9 and 6-10, indicate that
the percentage of requests falling under the nonreimbursable category is
noticeably higher for the largest companies. In these and the subsequent
tables, only license applications that had been totally rejected or approved are
considered. The link between size and share of nonreimbursables in the total
request is not a smoothly increasing one. Indeed, as the size of the firm
increases, the approval rate seems to dip before rising most clearly for the
largest firms. It was seen earlier, and confirmed in tables 6-9 and 6-10, that
requests under the nonreimbursable category have a much higher chance of
being accepted than those under the reimbursable one. In other words, if no
allowance is made for the relation of nonreimbursables to reimbursables, the
largest companies and exporters have the best chance of all of obtaining
approvals, thanks to their better access to nonreimbursable licenses, which is
a consequence of their links to foreign sources of credit, including conces-
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TABLE 6-11





Bogota or Medellin Elsewhere
Total
Total
Per Cent Total Per Cent Total Per Cent
Request RequestsApprovedRequestsApprovedRequestsApproved
Less than 50 159 66.0% 42 66.7% 201 66.2%
50—99 112 75.0 39 66.7 151 72.8
100—199 140 67.1 53 69.8 193 67.9
200—299 112
96
70.5 52 57.7 164 66.5
300—499 72.9 50 54.0 146 66.4
Morethan500 153 81.0 64 67.2 217 77.0
Total 772 72.0 300 63.7 1,072 69.7
SOURCE: See text.
Tables 6-9 and 6-10 also show that when only reimbursable license
applications are considered, the percentage approved shows no clear associa-
tion with size until the largest size categories are reached. Firms with more than
466 employees or more than U.S. $2 million of imports in 1970 show reimburs-
able approval rates clearly above the average.9
The geographical pattern of approvals and rejections is explored in tables
6-11 and 6-12, in relation to employment and minor exports. Sharp differences
in approval percentages between Bogota or MedellIn and the rest of Colombia
emerge clearly only for the three largest employment categories and the two
largest categories of minor exporters. In Table 6-12, firms from Bogota or
MedellIn with at least $50,000 in minor exports in 1970 have the largest
percentage of approvals, while in Table 6-li, the largest employers in Bogota
and MedellIn have the most successful performance of those shown.
In the total number of import requests from Bogota and Medellin under
the industrial category, the share of requests in the nonreimbursable group is
higher than the corresponding share for the rest of the country (12.2 per cent
versus 8.5 per cent). The same is true for the commercial category (10.4 per
cent versus 5.4 per cent). But even for reimbursable requests alone, the
percentage of approvals is higher for Bogota and MedellIn for both industrial
and commercial categories.
Of the total requests from foreign-owned industrial companies, 68.4 per
cent came from those located in Bogota and MedellIn, while the corresponding
percentage for national firms was 76.2. The share of nonreimbursable requests
in total requests from foreign-owned industrial companies was almost identi-
cal to the corresponding share in requests of national firms. Regardless of how
—--4Minor Exports
in 1970
Bogota or MedellIn Elsewhere Total
Total Per Cent Total Per Cent Total Per Cent
(thous. U.S. dol.)RequestsApprovedRequestsApprovedRequestsApproved
None 483 72.9% 139 67.6% 622 71.7%
1—49 154 63.0 67 70.1 221 65.2
50—399 84 79.8 54 50.0 138 68.1
400 or more 51 78.4 40 57.5 91 69.2
Total 772 72.0 300 63.7 1,072 69.7
SOURCE: Seetext.
requests are sliced, the percentage of approvals for requests by foreign-owned
industrial companies turns out to be nearly as high as that for national firms.
The finding that very large industrial firms located in Bogota or MedellIn
have a higher approval rate than all others is most clearly seen in Table 6-13
and in its underlying data. When partial rejections are omitted from the
sample, the combined approval rate for firms that imported less than $2 million
in 1970 orwerelocated outside Bogota and MedellIn was 68.4 per cent; the
corresponding rate for the big firms in MedellIn or Bogota was 83.7 per cent.
The null hypothesis, i.e., that there is no relation between chance of approval
and the circumstance of being a big firm located in Bogota or MedellIn, must be
rejected at the I per cent level of significance. If partial rejections are counted
as approvals, the approval rate is 86.8 per cent for big firms in Bogota and
MedellIn versus 73.5 per cent for all others. The null hypothesis can again be
rejected at the 1 per cent level of significance. Finally, if partial rejections are
registered as total rejections, the approval rates are 67.5 per cent for the large
firms in Bogota and MedellIn versus 57.3 per cent for the rest. Now the null
hypothesis can be rejected "only" at the 5percent level of significance.'°
It should be recalled that perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the
sample data is lack of information on the characteristics of requested imports,
particularly on whether or not they are competitive with local production. It is
conceivable, for example, that the higher share of approvals for large compa-
nies compared to all others could be explained by their more frequent requests
for imports not competitive with Colombian production, such as machinery
and equipment (often brought in under the nonreimbursable category) and
inputs originating in heavy industries. But while available data do not allow a
test of this hypothesis, it is doubtful that it could fully explain the foregoing
results.
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TABLE 6-12
Industrial Category: Approvals and Complete Rejections by Registered Minor Exports















More Than Less Than
U.S. $2 Mill.U.S. $2 Mill.
1970 Imports 1970 Imports
More Than Less Than
U.S. $2 Mill.U.S. $2 Mill.









In the first part of this chapter some characteristics of the major Colombian
importers were explored. In this section, a further examination will be made of
possible interrelationships among company size, imports, minor exports, and
wages and taxes paid for the total sample.
One way of carrying out such an analysis is to define, say, company
"import functions" as a means of explaining 1970 imports per employee on
the basis of size, ownership, and other independent variables. Similar
attempts can be made to explain company minor exports and taxes paid per
employee and company wages. One problem with these relations is that the
direction of causation is not always as clear as would be suggested by a model
specifying dependent and independent variables. The results shown in tables
6-14 and 6-15 should therefore be interpreted with caution; their usefulness
lies primarily in presenting in a systematic fashion the interrelations among
import, export, taxes, and wages as found in the sample data."
Industrial companies with high imports per employee clearly tend to pay
relatively high taxes per employee and high wages; more surprisingly, they
also have relatively high minor exports per employee. Once this nexus is
allowed for, the size variable as measured by number of employees in fact
suggests a negative link with per employee imports and exports, although such
negative connection may be partly spurious. Even after the indicated nexus is
taken into account, larger industrial companies appear to pay higher taxes per
employee, although not higher wages. For commercial companies the results,
shown in Table 6-15, are clearest regarding the per employee import-taxes
link, which is particularly strong.
A traditional criticism of a system that represses imports by quotas rather
than duties is that it involves public revenue losses. The data in tables 6-14
4
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TABLE 6-13
If'
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TABLE 6-14
Multiple Regressions for Imports, Exports, Wages, and Taxes per Employee
of Industrial Companies



















Constant —2.624 —2.869 —1.804 7.830










































































and 6-15 suggest that such a loss is only partial. Either because companies
eager to obtain import licenses pay higher-than-average income and sales
taxes, or because INCOMEX channels licenses toward especially efficient
companies, or both, the indication in the third column of Table 6-14 is that a 10
per cent increase in imports per employee appears to lead to a 3.5percent
increase in sales and income tax revenues of the government. In the commer-
cial group, the apparent feedback elasticity is nearly twice as great.
As argued by some INCOMEX officials, these results can be viewed as
the consequence of a policy of channeling the still scarce imports, ceteris
paribus, toward companies that yield the government high tax returns. It is
also argued that such compames "deserve" import permits, as they have
II
Si
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TABLE 6-15
shown themselves more efficient (profitable) than the rest, as revealed by their
high taxes and wages per employee. The chain of causation, of course, is
unclear, and is likely to run both ways in a manner difficult to untangle either
statistically or a priori.
Companies with high imports per employee also pay higher-than-average
wages. My data contain no information regarding industrial allocation or the
skill composition of company labor force. Conceivably, high imports per
employee may be correlated with the use of skilled labor commanding higher
wages, but while such reasoning is plausible for industrial companies, it has
much less force for commercial companies. Yet, in both tables 6-14 and 6-15,
a strong link is shown between wages and imports. On the whole, the figures
Multiple Regressions for Imports, Wages, and Taxes per Employee
of Commercial Companies
















Constant —0.352 1.820 7.435
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in the last columns of these two tables seem to support the hypothesis that
wages are related to the profitability of each company, with access to imports
being a key element in profitability.
The dummies for ownership and location emerge as significant in several
regressions. Foreign-owned industrial companies have higher imports per
employee than national ones and pay higher wages. The commercial ones also
clearly pay more taxes per employee. The observed results, as in earlier cases,
could arise from sector and skills variables not included in the regression.
Foreign-owned pharmaceutical companies, for example, are likely to have
high per employee imports and a skilled labor force not because they are
foreign-owned, but because they are in pharmaceuticals.
Industrial companies located in Bogota or MedellIn, not surprisingly,
appear to pay somewhat better wages, and have both higher-than-average
imports and tax payments per employee. For commercial companies only the
tendency to pay higher wages in Bogota or MedellIn remains.
The "minor export functions" yielded the poorest results, suggesting the
importance of industrial classification and other variables in explaining export
performance. Nevertheless, foreign-owned industrial companies and those
outside Bogota or Medellin are shown to have higher-than-average minor
exports per employee. More surprisingly at first sight are coefficients for
wages and per employee imports: companies with high per employee exports
tend to import more and pay higher wages. Once these variables are taken into
account, the size variable adopts a negative sign. But the data shown in the
two bottom lines of Table 6-4, regarding the concentration of large minor
exporters, cannot be gainsaid.
On the basis of the information shown in Table 6-4 and that presented in
Chapter 2,12 Colombian industrial minor exports in 1970 and 1971 do not
emerge as obviously intensive in unskilled labor and national raw materials.
Whether this is due to a failure of the Hecksher-Ohlin hypothesis in explaining
the Colombian trade pattern or the result of distortions induced by domestic




There is substantial concentration in the distribution of Colombian imports, a
concentration that makes the control system easier to manage. The control
system, in turn, appears to buttress such concentration because it gives the
largest companies, particularly those located in Bogota or MedellIn, a better
chance of obtaining licenses. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that it
was reached without taking into account the "discouraged firm" effect. In
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other words, data on actual import requests were generated by a group of
firms that had some hope of receiving a license; the average size of this group V
ofcompanies is larger than that for all industrial firms. Discouraged firms,
al which do not bother to apply, are in all likelihood small ones for which
transaction costs in license application loom relatively large. These smaller
firms often end up buying imported items from large commercial houses. $
Nevertheless,the bias toward import concentration arising solely from
preferential treatment of the largest firms in Bogota or MedellIn, ceteris
paribus, does not appear quantitatively very strong. Access to foreign credits
re and investments, which makes importation possible without immediate use of
foreign exchange, seems a more powerful force in biasing the operation of
import controls in favor of the largest (and best-connected) companies. One
may speculate that much of this concentrating influence would survive a
possible elimination of import controls.
In this chapter, attention was also called to the even greater concentra-
he tion of minor industrial exports in 1970 than imports. Given the tendency of
large import-intensive companies paying high wages, whatever their industrial
se activity, to use more capital-intensive methods than other firms, some skepti-
-or cism regarding the magnitude and even direction of employment and income-
or distributional effects of minor export expansion is warranted, at least for the
medium run. This, of course, does not mean that the encouragement of minor
to exports is a mistaken policy or that it will never generate more modern-sector
he employment than a comparable amount of import substitution. It does sug-
or gest, however, that for a given over-all growth rate, the employment differ-
ence may be only marginally superior, so long as the 1970 industrial and
in export structure is maintained. It may be hoped that such a structure could
ot still reflect the early stages of industrial export promotion, one which may
Is. change as new exporters, less committed to earlier import-substituting yen-
ng tures, enter the field.
tic While the revealed INCOMEX criteria for allocating import licenses
ng include the historical import record of companies, no evidence has appeared
that this "fair-share" approach is rigidly applied or that it is linked systemati-
cally to installed capacity. Resolution 15 forms for the industrial category do
request information on maximum production capacity. But that information,
provided in physical units by some companies and in value terms by others, is
• clumsy and less easily handled by INCOMEX than the four-year import
a record expressed in dollars appearing in the same form. Therefore, although
rol the protection generated by the import control system combined with the
:he monopolistic competition also encouraged by that system can lead to excess
ter capacity in some import-competing sectors, a matter to be reviewed in
•.t it Chapter 8, it would be difficult to argue that INCOMEX fair-share rules lead
In companies to create excess capacity for the sake of improving their chances of
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obtaining import licenses, as appears to have been the case in India and
Turkey. By seeking information on company inventories of merchandise r
involvedin the import request, as well as on the value of past requests
approved but not actually used, INCOMEX attempts to limit spurious crea-
tion of import "track records," an unimportant is sue at any rate during 1970—
71.
The avoidance of rigid rules combined nevertheless with a style making
access to import licenses far from "democratic" has probably helped reduce
the real resource costs in the public and private sectors of running the import
controlmachinery.Itwas seenthatthebureaucratic framework of
INCOMEX is quite lean. During 1970—71, large private companies did incur
additional costs in trying to obtain import licenses, but even so, their marginal
cost of dealing with INCOMEX was small, partly because of the clarity of the
unwritten rules of the game, and partly because of reliance on company clerks
who were used to dealing with many public agencies involved in matters such
as taxation, credit, health, and other regulations. In other words, the fixed
costs for a large company of keeping a Bogota lobby could be spread out (
among several activities, only one of which was dealing with INCOMEX.
Smaller firms outside of this circle typically would not invest resources trying
to break in; under a more populistic environment they probably would,
leading to a greater resource use by the import control system.'3
I
APPENDIX: COMPANIES WITH IMPORTS WORTH
MORE THAN $1 MILLION IN 1970
(N.B. Companies placed by INCOMEX under both the industrial and com-
mercial categories are here listed only under the industrial category.)
Foreign-owned; Industrial
PRESUMED MAJOR ACTIVITY
Abonos Colombianos, S.A. (I.P.C.)Fertilizers
Aluminio Alcan de Colombia, S.A. Aluminum products
Armco Colombiana, S.A. Construction materials and welding
equipment
BASF QuImica Colombiana, S.A. Chemicals
Bayer de Colombia, S.A. Pharmaceuticals
Bristol Farmacéutica, S.A. Pharmaceuticals
Carton de Colombia, S.A. (Container
Corporation of America) Paper products
Cela Colombiana Ltda. Printing
Celanese Colombiana, S.A. Textiles (synthetic fibers)APPENDIX 179
d Foreign-owned; Industrial (continued)
PRESUMED MAJOR ACTIVITY
V e Ciba Colombiana, S.A. Pharmaceuticals
S Colgate Palmolive, S.A. Soap, toothpaste, chemicals
Cyanamid de Colombia, S.A. Chemicals
Dow Qulmica de Colombia, S.A. Chemicals
Du Pont de Colombia, S.A. Chemicals
Eli Lilly Interamericana, Inc. Pharmaceuticals
Enka de Colombia, S.A. Tires
E. R. Squibb and Sons, S.A. Pharmaceuticals
Eternit Colombiana, S.A. (Johns
al Mansville Corporation) Construction materials
Fábrica Chrysler Colombiana de
S.A. Automobiles
Fábrica de Hilazas Vanylon, S .A. Textiles (synthetic fibers)
•;d General Electric de Colombia, S.A.Electrical equipment
Ut Goodyear de Colombia, S.A. Tires
Hilanderlas MedellIn, S.A. (Branch
River Wool Combing Co.) Textiles
d Hilos Cadena Textiles
Hoechst Colombiana, S.A. Chemicals and drugs
I.B.M. de Colombia, S.A. Office machines
Icollantas, S.A. (B.F. Goodrich) Tires
Industrias Phillips de Colombia, S.A.Electrical equipment
International Petroleum Colombia
Ltda. (I.P.C.) Petroleum refining
Laboratorios Life, S.A. Pharmaceuticals
Laboratorios Undra, S .A. Pharmaceuticals
Monómeros Colombo-Venezolanos,
S.A.'4 Petrochemicals
Monsanto Colombiana, Inc. Chemicals





(Diamond Shamrock Co.) Petrochemicals
Polimeros Colombianos, S.A. Synthetic fibers, chemicals
Productos Quaker, S.A. Foodstuffs
Productora de Papeles, S.A. (Grace)Paper products
QuImica Schering Colombiana, S.A.Chemicals
Rhinco Productos QuImicos, S.A. Chemicals
Sandoz Colombiana Ltda. Pharmaceuticals180IMPORT CONTROLS IN 1970—71:SOME QUANTIFIABLE FEATURES
Foreign-owned; Industrial (concluded)
PRESUMED MAJOR AcTIvITY
Siemens Colombiana, S.A. Telephone material and electronics
SOFASA (Renault-IF!) Automobile engines
Texas Petroleum Co. Petroleum products
The Sidney Ross Company of
Colombia Pharmaceuticals
Uniroyal Croydon, S.A. Tires
Aluminio de Colombia, Ltda.
(Reynolds Metals) Aluminum products





Productos Qulmicos Esso, Inc.
Shell Colombiana, S.A.
Union Carbide Colombiana, S.A.
National; Industrial
AcerIas Paz del Rio, S.A. Steel
Bavaria, S.A. Beer
Britilana Benrey Ltda. Not known (,
CanoIsaza y Cia. Not known
Cales y Cementos de Toloviejo, S.A.Construction materials
Carvajal y Cia. Printing
Casa Editorial El Tiempo Publishing
Cementos del Caribe, S.A. Cement
Cia. Colombiana de Alcalís Chemicals
Cia. Colombiana de Tabaco Cigarettes





Corporación de Acero (Corpacero) Steel products
David y Eduardo Puyana Liquor and cigarettes
Detergentes Limitada Detergents
Empresa Siderürgica, S.A. Steel products
Fábrica de Hilados y Tejidos del kr





Gaseosas Posada Tobón, S.A. Beverages
IFI-Concesión de Salinas Mining of salt
Leónidas Lara e Hijos Agricultural machinery and autos
Lioreda, Jabones y Glicerina, Ltda.Soaps, detergents
Planta Colombiana de Soda Chemicals
Productos Fitosanitarios de Colom-
bia, S.A. Not known
Rosemberg Hermanos e Hijos Toiletries and soap




Tejidos Leticia, Ltda. Textiles












Jorge Manuel GOmez (Jomago)
Nepomuceno Cartagena e Hijos





I.Inestablishing company ownership, Iplacedheavy reliance on informationsuppliedby
knowledgeable Colombians and on the following: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
International Commerce. Apnerjcan Firms, Subsidiaries and Affiliates —Colombia (Washington,182IMPORTCONTROLS IN 1970—71:SOMEQUANTIFIABLE FEATURES
D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, May 1970); "The Fortune Directory; The 300 largest industrials
outsidethe U.S.,"Fortune,August1972, pp. 152— 161; and Juvenal L. Angel, ed.,Directoryof
AmericanFirms Operating in Foreign Countries, 7th ed. (New York: WorldTrade,1969).
2. In several cases, a given company in the sample had import requests listed by INCOMEX
p
under both the industrial and commercial categories. In those cases, the company was placed only
under the industrial category. The same procedure was followed in the few cases in which a
a
company was listed under both the industrial and official categories (e.g., Acerlas Paz del Rio).
3. Total income and sales taxes paid in cash during 1970 amounted to P7,220 million, as h
reported in the Revista del Banco de Ia Repdblica. These data, like those shown in the tables,
exclude tax payments made with tax certificates issued in connection with export subsidy
payments. Total national tax revenues in the same year were P12,591 million. The number of a
workers and employees engaged in manufacturing and registered with the Colombian Social $
Security Institute was 384,600 in December 1970. See Gabriel Turbay M., "Una PolItica Industrial $
Para Estimular Las Exportaciones y Fomentar al Empleo," mimeographed (FEDESARROLLO,
May 1972), Table 9. The equivalent amount for the commercial sector was 203,000. For both
commerce and manufacturing, the employment figures are limited mostly to their "modern" r
segments, leaving out the "informal" sector.
4. See Turbay, "Una Politica Industrial," Table 9. This source reports the following number Ii
of firms in mining and manufacturing for December 1970: d r
Size Category Number of Firms P
More than 500 employees 84 d
More than 250 but less than d
501 employees 143
More than 100 but less than c
251 employees 487
Direct comparison of INCOMEX data with those from the Industrial Census is not possible as a
the latter reports on plants, not companies.
.5. See FEDESARROLLO, Coyuntura Económica, July 1972, Table X.2, p. 87.
6. Major importers under the official category have of course a different nature than those
listed under industry and commerce. In our sample of official requests the following characteristics
were isolated:
1970 Registered
Registered import Category, Number of Imports
1970 Institutions (mill. U.S. dol.)
More than $1 mill. 19 130.83
Between $0.5 mill. and $1 mill. 10 7.17
Between $0.1 mill. and $0.5 mill. 16 4.11
Total major official importers 45 142.11
The largest official importers include institutions such as municipal and national public
utilities (electricity, telephones, and waterworks); public agencies marketing basic foodstuffs
(IDEMA) or rural inputs (Caja Agraria); and the ministries of Public Works and Defense.
For 1970, the 119 largest industrial, commercial, and official importers combined accounted
for $445 million in registered imports, or 48 per cent of the total import bill.
7. See James Tobin, "The Application of Multivariate Probit Analysis to Economic Survey
Data," mimeographed, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1, December 1, 1955. The condition
that the dependent variable must always have a value within the interval from zero to I cannot beNOTES 183
is maintained if its expected value is assumed to be a linear combination of the independent
variables, as in multiple regressions. "Moreover, the multiple regression model assumes inappro-
priately for this case, that the distribution of the dependent variable around its expected value is
x independentof the level of that expected value" (Tobin, p. 2). See also Paul L. Joskow, "A
Behavioral Theory of Public Utility Regulation" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1972) for another
a application of probit analysis.
8. The average value of import requests under the industrial nonreimbursable category,
as however, was only U.S. $8,200, compared to $12,174 for those in the reimbursable category. In
the commercial group the corresponding figures were $2,285 and $5,276.
9. When partial rejections are counted as approvals, the percentages of reimbursable licenses
of approved, according to size as measured by 1970 imports in U.S. dollars, are as follows: under
$50,000, 70.1; over $50,000, but under $200,000, 71.3; over $200,000, but under $500,000, 71.2; over
$500,000, but under $2 million, 70.7; over $2 million, 81.5.
10. The statistics used in the chi-square test (with one degree of freedom) are as follows:
th partial rejections omitted, 8.642; partial rejections as acceptances, 9.082; and partial rejections as
rejections, 4.098.
11. Note also that the calculations in tables 6-14 and 6-15, although based only on the census-
er like information of my sample, have as many observations as tables 6-7 and 6-8. In other words,
duplications were not weeded Out, and data for a given company may appear several times. This is
partly to avoid the laborious effort involved in the weeding-out process. In making the compila-
tions, it was also noted that on several occasions what appeared to be the same company had
different information in different import requests; this could be due to changes in company
definitions or in time coverage or simply to errors of observation. No obvious criteria for choosing
one set of information over another could be devised. As in earlier regressions, when a given
company happened to have, say, zero minor exports or imports, these zeros were transformed
into ls, so that the logarithms would make sense. Finally, the simple correlation coefficients
as among the variables appearing in the more interesting Table 6-14 should be noted. Denoting X1,
X7 the independent variables in the order in which they are presented in Table 6-14
(extreme left-hand column), we have the following results:




X4 0.09 —0.45 0.01
0.08 —0.21 0.06 0.23
X6 0.03 —0.47 0.02 0.42 0.33 —
—0.22 —0.11 —0.16 0.15 0.12 0.16
12. Albert Berry has also noted that data on Colombian industrial two-digit sectors for 1971
show a positive correlation between share of output exported and horsepower per worker. As of
1971, the major two-digit sectors in terms of gross value of exports were textiles, food products,
chemicals, nonmetallic minerals, paper products, and leather products.
•blic 13. For a stimulating discussion of these issues placed in a general context, see Anne 0.
ill's Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review,
June 1974, pp. 291—303.
ited 14. This is a joint Colombo-Venezuelan venture, with public sector participation. Thus, its
nature is quite different from the rest of the companies on this list.
vey
Lion
•tbe